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AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
MIAH GIBSON 
Forced migration has been the subject of intense debate in the past 50 years 
and has spawned a wealth of literature as a result. Few commentators, 
however, have considered the value or viability of an international agreement 
on refugee resettlement that would include mandatory resettlement quotas. 
This article puts forward a proposal for an International Convention on 
Refugee Resettlement. Such a convention would, I argue, help to address 
some of the current limitations of resettlement as a solution to the increase in 
refugee numbers. Appendix 1 contains the suggested wording for such a 
convention, drawing on several international human rights treaties 
(particularly the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) as well 
as resettlement principles and policies set out by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Appendix 2 provides explanatory 
notes for the draft wording. It is hoped that such wording might be of use to 
those campaigning for the development of a binding, international agreement 
on resettlement. 
I INTRODUCTION 
‘The world is awash with refugees’, wrote Peter Schuck, Simeon E Baldwin 
Professor of Law Emeritus at Yale University and a well-known commentator 
on refugee and migration law, in 1997.1 At that time, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) estimated the global refugee 
population to be 13 million.2 As at 31 May 2017 it was 25.9 million — the 
                                                 
 JD (with Distinction), University of Southern Queensland; BA (Media and Communications), 
University of Melbourne; Dip Languages (Russian), Macquarie University; GradDipLegPrac, 
College of Law Australia; refugee and migration law practitioner and member of the European 
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1 Peter H Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden Sharing: A Modest Proposal’ (1997) 22(2) Yale Journal of 
International Law 243, 244. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), The State of the World’s 
Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (1997) <http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7bb534.html>. 
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highest level of people displacement on record.3 The international community 
is struggling to provide protection and assistance to this extremely vulnerable 
group of people. 
One of the means by which protection and assistance can be provided is through 
resettlement. The UNHCR defines resettlement as the selection and transfer of 
refugees from a state in which they have sought protection (the ‘asylum 
country’) to a third state which has agreed to admit them as refugees with 
permanent residence status (the ‘resettlement country’).4 The status provided 
ensures that the refugee will not be forcibly expelled or returned to his or her 
country of origin (‘refoulement’) and will be able to access rights similar to 
those enjoyed by nationals of the resettlement country. Resettlement carries 
with it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalised citizen of the 
resettlement country.5  
Resettlement is one of three durable solutions for refugees. The other two are 
voluntary repatriation, whereby the refugee returns to his or her country of 
origin voluntarily when it is safe to do so;6 and, local integration, whereby the 
refugee settles in the asylum country (with that country’s permission).7 The 
hosting of large refugee populations can present challenges for asylum 
countries through increasing pressures on the asylum country’s economy, 
causing social disruption, posing security risks, and burdening the health and 
welfare systems of the country concerned.  
Resettlement is considered an exercise in ‘burden-sharing’. It eases the 
pressures on asylum countries (which are typically developing countries)8 by 
shifting some of the resource-drain to resettlement countries (typically 
                                                 
3 UNHCR, UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2020 (Report from 25th Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, 1–2 July 2019) 9 <https://www.unhcr. 
org/5d1384047.pdf>.  
4 ‘Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement’, UNHCR (November 2013) <http://www. 
unhcr.org/524c31666.pdf>. 
5 UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 (July 2011) <http://www. 
refworld.org/docid/4ecb973c2.html>. 
6 ‘Voluntary Repatriation’, UNHCR (Web Page, 2017) <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/voluntary-
repatriation-49c3646cfe.html>. 
7 ‘Local Integration’, UNHCR (Web Page, 2017) <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/local-integration-
49c3646c101.html>. 
8 Some 86% of refugees live in the developing world. See Sarah Deardorff Miller, Assessing the 
Impacts of Hosting Refugees (World Refugee Council Research Paper No 4, Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, August 2018).  
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developed countries).9 Of course, refugees also provide economic, cultural and 
social benefits for the countries that receive them, and resettlement countries 
have profited from this.10 
In this article, I explain why resettlement remains an important tool in 
addressing current refugee crises and provide a brief outline of the resettlement 
process and of the history of resettlement. I also outline the problems associated 
with resettlement, including the lack of available places, the use of resettlement 
to justify harsh asylum policies, the tainting influence of domestic pressures 
and foreign policy on resettlement programs, and the inclusion of 
discriminatory criteria in resettlement decision-making.  
I examine how resettlement is currently regulated and consider the potential 
impact of the Global Compact on Refugees (the ‘Compact’), adopted by the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2018.11 I then propose a new 
multilateral convention that will address the shortcomings of resettlement as a 
tool for the protection of refugees: the ‘International Convention on Refugee 
Resettlement’. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this proposal, and 
explain why the time is ripe for the international community to consider it.  
Finally, I offer a suggested wording for this Convention, drawing on recent 
commentary about resettlement from the UNHCR.  
II DISCUSSION 
A The Resettlement Process 
There is no legal obligation on any country, including those countries that are 
party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘1951 
                                                 
9 Stefan Sperl and Irinel Brădişteanu, Refugee Resettlement in Developing Countries: The 
Experience of Benin and Burkina Faso, 1997 — 2003: An Independent Evaluation (UNHCR 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit and Resettlement and Special Cases Section, April 2004) 
<https://www.unhcr.org/40cd76a8a.pdf>. The authors indicate that the Human Development 
Index was used to determine the definition of ‘developing’ as opposed to ‘developed’ countries: 
at 3.  
10 AMES and Deloitte Access Economics, Small Towns Big Returns: Economic and Social 
Impact of the Karen Resettlement in Nhill (Report, 2015) <https://www2.deloitte.com/ 
content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/Economics/deloitte-au-economics-small-towns-big-
returns-nhill-resettlement-270415.pdf>. 
11 Office of the UNHCR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Part II 
Global Compact on Refugees, Supplement No 12 A/73/12 (Part II) (2 August 2018, adopted 17 
December 2018) (‘Global Compact on Refugees’). 
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Convention’)12 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘1967 
Protocol’),13 to resettle refugees. Resettlement is an entirely voluntary activity.  
The countries that choose to undertake resettlement generally enlist the help of 
the UNHCR to select potential candidates. The UNHCR undertakes 
resettlement in furtherance of its mandate to arrange international protection 
and durable solutions for refugees.14 The first step in the UNHCR process is the 
determination that the person is a refugee, known as Refugee Status 
Determination (‘RSD’). This may be carried out by officials of the asylum 
country hosting the refugee or, if the country is unable or unwilling to do so, by 
the UNHCR.15 Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol a refugee is 
defined as someone who is outside their country of origin, unable or unwilling 
to return or avail themselves of the protection of that country, because they have 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.16  
Once the person has been recognised as a refugee, they are entitled to the 
protections provided by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Those who 
face protection risks in the asylum country or have particular needs may be 
considered by the UNHCR for resettlement. Only refugees who have one or 
more of the following categories of need can be considered for resettlement:17 
1. Legal and/or physical protection needs in the asylum country, including 
those arising from a threat of refoulement; 
2. The needs arising from the refugee being a survivor of torture and/or 
violence, in particular where repatriation or the conditions of asylum 
                                                 
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 
137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) art 1. 
13 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered 
into force 4 October 1967) art 1. 
14 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees A/RES/428(V) 
(14 December 1950) art 9. 
15 Rachel Westerby and Sophie Ngo-Diep, Welcome to Europe! A Comprehensive Guide to 
Resettlement (International Catholic Migration Commission, July 2013) 10 <http://www. 
resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/ICMC%20Europe-Welcome%20to%20Europe.pdf>. 
16 Note that this definition has since been extended by the ‘generalised violence’ category, and 
by regional agreements such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees. However, the original definition suffices for the purposes of this article. See BC 
Nirmal, ‘Refugees and Human Rights’ [2001] 6 ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian 
and Refugee Law 94, 94. 
17 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 (n 5) 216.  
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could result in further traumatisation and/or a heightened risk; or where 
appropriate treatment is not available in the asylum country; 
3. Medical needs, in particular where life-saving treatment is not available 
in the asylum country; 
4. The special needs of women and girls at risk, who have protection 
problems particular to their gender; 
5. The need for family reunification, when resettlement is the only means 
to reunite refugee family members who, owing to flight or 
displacement, are separated by borders or continents; 
6. The special needs of children and adolescents at risk where a Best 
Interests Determination18 supports resettlement; 
7. The special needs of those who have no foreseeable alternative durable 
solutions. In this case resettlement can be used strategically and/or can 
create possibilities for comprehensive solutions. 
The assessment of resettlement need is generally done during one or more face-
to-face interviews. UNHCR staff may also conduct background checks and 
visits to the refugee’s home. The resettlement staff then complete a 
Resettlement Registration Form, or a similar document, which includes 
biographical data on the refugee and their family members, a summary of the 
RSD and information about the refugee’s resettlement needs.19 This form is 
then submitted to a resettlement country for consideration.  
The decision on which resettlement country should receive the refugee is based 
on the availability of resettlement places, the urgency of the resettlement need 
and the resettlement country’s specific criteria. Most countries impose their 
                                                 
18 A ‘Best Interests Determination’ is a formal process designed to determine a child’s best 
interests for particularly important decisions affecting them, such as resettlement. It 
incorporates strict procedural safegards. See UNHCR, UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the 
Best Interests of the Child (Guide, May 2018) <https://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf>. 
19 UNHCR Resettlement Service, UNHCR-NGO Toolkit for Practical Cooperation on 
Resettlement (Policy Instructions, June 2011) <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/protection/ 
resettlement/4cd418c89/unhcr-ngo-toolkit-practical-cooperation-resettlement-operational-
activities.html>. 
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own additional resettlement criteria, such as good health, good character, 
family size, family composition, and so-called ‘integration potential’.20 
Once the resettlement country has received the submission, government 
officials will generally interview the refugee and their family members again 
and may conduct further health and character checks. Some countries accept 
resettlement submissions on a ‘dossier’ basis, that is, without conducting their 
own interview with the refugee. The resettlement country retains the ultimate 
right to reject or accept the refugee for resettlement. If a refugee is rejected, the 
UNHCR will decide whether to refer them to an alternative resettlement 
country.21 
B A Brief History of Resettlement 
While refugee movements occurred well before the 20th century,22 large-scale 
resettlement emerged in the aftermath of World War II, when many hundreds 
of thousands of European refugees were resettled within Europe and in 
countries such as Australia and the United States.23 During the Indochinese 
wars of the late 1970s and 1980s, approximately 1.2 million Vietnamese 
refugees and other asylum seekers were resettled in 30 different countries.24 At 
this time resettlement was seen as the preferred solution for refugees escaping 
this conflict.25 
                                                 
20 Sean Henderson, ‘Is “Integration Potential” a Criterion for Resettlement?’ (Speech, European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles Biannual General Meeting, Paris, France, 30–31 October 2008) 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/492a7a4b2.pdf>. 
21 UNHCR Resettlement Service, UNHCR Guidelines on the Resubmission of Resettlement Cases 
(Guidance Paper, UNHCR, 2012) <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ff165b12.pdf>. 
22 See, eg, Alyssa Girvan, ‘400 Years of Refugee Movement to the UK’, Refugee History 
(Timeline Resource, June 2018) 1–3 <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5748678dcf80a1 
ffcaf26975/t/5b27e22baa4a99efbe7e7a33/1529340463491/Refugee+Timeline.pdf>; Sylvie 
Aprile and Delphine Diaz, ‘Europe and its Political Refugees in the 19th Century’, tr Kate 
McNaughton, Collège de France 1530 (Essay, 18 April 2016) 1–3 
<https://booksandideas.net/Europe-and-its-Political-Refugees-in-the-19th-Century.html>. 
23 See, eg, ‘History of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program’, Refugee Council USA (Web 
Page, 2017) <http://www.rcusa.org/history/>; ‘How Do Refugees Come to Australia under its 
Refugee and Humanitarian Program?’, Refugee Council of Australia (Web Page, 11 May 2016) 
9–10 <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/coming-to-australia/>. 
24 Sébastien Moretti, ‘Southeast Asia and the Disenchantment with Resettlement’ (February 
2017) 54 Forced Migration Review 20; Shauna Labman, ‘Resettlement’s Renaissance: A 
Cautionary Advocacy’ (2007) 24(2) Refuge 35, 36. 
25 John Fredriksson and Christine Mougne, Resettlement in the 1990s: A Review of Policy and 
Practice, UN Doc EVAL/RES/14 (December 1994) 5. 
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Yet the magnitude of the Indochinese resettlement operation brought certain 
problems to the fore. While the first waves of asylum seekers had fled 
persecution in their home countries, and fell within the international definition 
of refugee,26 the later waves from the early 1980s into the early 1990s included 
a considerable number who had left Vietnam for economic and social reasons.27 
The UNHCR found that the decision to adopt resettlement as the preferred 
solution,28 and to take an ‘across-the-board’ approach to resettlement in the 
region had created a pull factor for many Vietnamese.29  
From this point onwards, and in order to help prevent the mixing of refugee and 
economic migrant flows in future, the UNHCR shifted its stance, and 
resettlement became the solution of ‘last resort’. It was only considered if 
voluntary repatriation and local integration were not possible.30 In 1992, the 
UNHCR declared the 1990s to be the ‘decade of repatriation’ and emphasised 
that the UNHCR should pursue every opportunity for voluntary repatriation.31  
Resettlement numbers over this period are indicative of these trends: total 
global resettlement in 1970 was 1366, but this jumped to 69,871 in 1980.32 It 
reached a peak of 176,635 in 1990, before dropping significantly in the 
following decade.33 The fear of international terrorism that followed the 
                                                 
26 S Chantavanich and P Rabe, ‘Thailand and the Indochinese Refugees: Fifteen Years of 
Compromise and Uncertainty’ (1990) 18(1) Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 66, 66–
8. 
27 Fredriksson and Mougne (n 25) 20, 32; Lesleyanne Hawthorne, Refugee: The Vietnamese 
Experience (Oxford University Press, 1982). 
28 This was due to the sheer volume of refugees and the international community’s response, 
which pushed countries to offer resettlement. See eg Shamsul Bari, ‘Refugee Status 
Determination under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA): A Personal Assessment’ (1992) 
4(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 487; W Courtland Robinson, ‘The Comprehensive 
Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the 
Buck’ (2004) 17(3) Journal of Refugees Studies 319, 324–6. 
29 Moretti (n 24) 20; Justin Huynh, ‘Tales of the Boat People: Comparing Refugee Resettlement 
in the Vietnamese and Syrian Crises’ (2016) 48 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 198, 204.  
30 Labman (n 24) 36; Haruno Nakashiba, Postmillennial UNHCR Refugee Resettlement: New 
Developments and Old Challenges, (Research Paper No 265, UNHCR Policy Development and 
Evaluation Service, November 2013) 4. 
31 Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Statement by Mrs Sadako Ogata’ 
(Speech, International Management Symposium, Switzerland, 25 May 1992) 
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68faec/statement-mrs-sadako-ogata-
united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees-international.html>. 
32 ‘Population Statistics’, UNHCR (Web Page, Database) <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en 
/resettlement>. 
33 Ibid.  
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September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 contributed to a large 
reduction in refugee resettlement: it had dropped to 50,079 by 2002.34  
In 2015, even after resettlement countries pledged a massive increase in the 
numbers of Syrians they were prepared to resettle, the total number of refugees 
resettled was 107,048 — well short of its peak in 199035 and less than 10% of 
the number of refugees assessed as requiring resettlement.36 Of the 1.2 million 
refugees assessed as needing resettlement in 2018, only 55,692 were actually 
resettled; in other words, less than 5% of global refugee resettlement needs were 
met in 2018. For 2019, it is estimated that 1.4 million refugees, residing in 65 
countries of asylum, will need resettlement.37 
The discrepancy between resettlement need and resettlement opportunity has 
led many to conclude that resettlement is simply not a viable solution for 
refugees.38 Based on the resettlement outcome in 2018, it would take some 20 
years to resettle even the refugees currently in need of resettlement. 
Resettlement countries are very conservative in their resettlement programs. 
They are unwilling to commit to large-scale resettlement which may prove 
costly, a drain on infrastructure and resources, and unpopular domestically.39 
Resettlement in its current incarnation is thus not an effective burden-sharing 
tool.40   
The imbalance between resettlement need and resettlement availability is not 
the only argument against resettlement. Resettlement has also been criticised 
because: 
1. it has been used by some states to reduce their asylum obligations;41  
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. Note that this figure represents arrivals of resettled refugees, with or without the 
UNHCR’s assistance. This dataset is based on Government statistics and, in principle, excludes 
other humanitarian admissions. 
36 UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2020 (n 3). 
37 ‘Less Than 5 Per Cent of Global Refugee Resettlement Needs Met Last Year’, UNHCR 
(Summary of press briefing, 19 February 2019) <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/briefing/ 
2019/2/5c6bc9704/5-cent-global-refugee-resettlement-needs-met-year.html>. 
38 Oliver White, ‘Why Resettlement Is Not the Solution to the World’s Refugee Crisis’, Jesuit 
Refugee Service Australia (10 October 2016) <http://www.jrs.org.au/resettlement-not-solution-
worlds-refugee-crisis/>. 
39 Schuck (n 1) 249. 
40 Labman (n 24) 37. 
41 White (n 38). 
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2. it is vulnerable to the forces of domestic and international politics;42 
and 
3. it is discriminatory because resettlement countries impose additional, 
non-protection-based criteria to exclude refugees, leaving them with no 
durable solution.43 
These criticisms are considered in more detail under the next heading. 
C Problems with Resettlement 
1 The Trade Off with Asylum 
Resettlement is not mandatory. There is no legal obligation on a country to 
resettle refugees and no refugee has a right to resettlement.44 Rather, a refugee’s 
right to asylum is protected by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention stipulates that no Contracting State shall 
refoule a refugee to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.45  
As Peter Schuck has pointed out, this is the only clear obligation contained in 
the 1951 Convention; most of the other provisions contain qualifying phrases 
and other limitations that actually protect the interests of the receiving state.46 
Some have inferred a principle of international solidarity from the text of the 
1951 Convention and other international instruments but, as Schuck notes, this 
does not equate to an authoritative legal principle and there have been very few 
instances of effective burden-sharing arrangements which expand refugee 
protection.47 
                                                 
42 Labman (n 24) 38–40. 
43 Henderson (n 20) 2–3. 
44 Shauna Labman, ‘Queue the Rhetoric: Refugees, Resettlement and Reform’ (2011) 62 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 55, 56.  
45 1951 Convention (n 12) art 33. 
46 Peter H Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden Sharing: A Modest Proposal Fifteen Years Later?’ in Anita 
Shapira et al (eds), Contemporary Challenges to the Nation State: Global and Israeli 
Perspectives, vol 3: The Nation State and Immigration: The Age of Multiculturalism, ch 4 
(2014) 67, 73.  
47 Ibid. 
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The UNHCR has been at pains to point out that resettlement and asylum should 
be viewed as two distinct but complementary possibilities, to be ‘pursued in 
tandem, and not used to work against each other’.48 Yet some countries 
deliberately use resettlement as a means of reducing access to asylum and 
avoiding their non-refoulement obligation.49 Canada, for example, introduced 
tighter border controls in 2010 — including mandatory detention and bans on 
applying for permanent residency — which make it more difficult for a refugee 
to claim asylum, while simultaneously increasing the number of resettlement 
places provided to refugees.50 The larger resettlement program prevents 
criticism of the reduced asylum opportunities that might otherwise ensue. It 
also serves to separate refugees into two categories: the deserving, ‘waiting 
patiently to come to the country’ through resettlement, and the underserving 
who arrive in Canada ‘through the back door’.51 Yet, as many commentators 
point out, it is illogical to imply that refugees who arrive in Canada on their 
own to access asylum are somehow less genuine than those who are resettled 
through UNHCR processes, and do not require protection.52 The end result of 
the asylum-resettlement trade-off is that some asylum seekers are unable to 
access the protection they need and international legal obligations towards 
refugees are evaded and eroded.53 
2 The Influence of Politics 
Numerous researchers have pointed out that decisions on the size, composition 
and even the existence of resettlement programs are influenced by political 
factors such as foreign policy and electoral interests.54 Even the UNHCR has 
acknowledged the ‘desire of governments to facilitate the movement of certain 
people for foreign and domestic policy reasons’ via resettlement.55  
                                                 
48 Erika Feller, ‘Address’, UNHCR (Speech, International Conference on the Reception and 
Integration of Resettled Refugees, Norrköping, Sweden, 25 April 2001) <https://www. 
refworld.org/docid/429d73372.html>. 
49 Labman (n 44). 
50 Ibid 58.  
51 Ibid, citing statements made in 2009 by the former Canadian Immigration Minister, Jason 
Kenney. 
52 Ibid 57. 
53 Ibid 55. 
54 Maria O’Sullivan, ‘The Ethics of Resettlement: Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2016) 
20(2) International Journal of Human Rights 241; Schuck (n 46). 
55 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 (n 5) 47. 
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Resettlement in the United States is illustrative. Some 40% of the US’s total 
resettlement intake between 1959 and 1991 was from the Soviet Union.56 There 
were strong ideological reasons for this: refugees resettled during the Cold War 
helped provide justification for the US’s political stance at the time. Their 
defection was seen as an ideological triumph.57 From a practical perspective, 
this large resettlement program also helped address labour shortages in the post-
war economic boom.58  
Indochinese resettlement in the 1970s and 1980s was motivated by a different 
political agenda: namely, a need to provide some form of recompense for the 
role the US played in the Vietnam War.59 The resettlement of Iraqis from 2007 
onwards may have had a similar rationale.60 Commenting at the time on the 
resettlement of Iraqis, the then Senator Edward M Kennedy of Massachusetts 
noted, ‘we can’t solve the problem alone, but we obviously bear a heavy 
responsibility for the crisis’.61 The researcher SB Ray has argued that the 
greatest beneficiaries of US resettlement have been refugees from countries that 
the US has engaged in war.62  
This is not to say that those resettled from the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Iraq 
during these periods were not in need of resettlement. Allowing foreign policy 
goals and domestic interests to dictate the size and composition of resettlement 
programs will, however, leave a large number of refugees without access to 
resettlement, simply because they are from countries that are not politically 
influential or domestically ‘popular’. Countries in Africa (described as the 
‘neglected continent’ by the Norwegian Refugee Council due to the lack of 
funding for refugee protection),63 particularly sub-Saharan Africa, suffer the 
most. In 2018, 17,094 refugees were resettled from Africa (excluding North 
                                                 
56 Thais Bessa, ‘From Political Instrument to Protection Tool? Resettlement of Refugees and 
North-South Relations’ (2009) 26(1) Refuge 91, 93. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Shalini Bhargava Ray, ‘Optimal Asylum’ (2013) 46(5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1215, 1223. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Rachel L Swarns and Katherine Zoepf, ‘More Iraqi Refugees Are Headed to U.S.’, New York 
Times (online, 14 February 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/washington/14 
refugees.html>. 
62 Ray (n 59). 
63 Richard Skretteberg, ‘2019 Will Be Another Year of Crises’, Norwegian Refugee Council 
(Web Page, 2019) <https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/2019-will-be-another-year-of-crises/ 
index.html>. 
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Africa),64 while the total resettlement needs for this region were estimated at 
almost 511,000.65 Thus just over 3% of those needing resettlement actually 
departed for a resettlement country. For the Asia Pacific and Europe66 regions, 
these figures were 10% and 40% respectively.67  
The first quarter of 2017 provided perhaps the most persuasive example of the 
negative impact of politics on refugee resettlement. US President Trump’s 
Executive Order 13769: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry 
into the United States68 (‘Executive Order 13769’) banned the entry into the US 
of nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. These 
are countries from which a high proportion of refugees come and were among 
the largest contributors of refugees to the US’s resettlement program.69  
Executive Order 13769 also suspended the US’s refugee resettlement program 
for 120 days (from 16 March till 14 July 2017) for all foreign nationals.70 The 
total refugee resettlement program was reduced by more than half to 50,000.71  
While Executive Order 13769 was ostensibly about security, in reality it was 
an effort to gain support domestically for the Trump Administration.72 As 
outlined above, the resettlement process is lengthy and involves vetting at 
multiple stages, usually by both the resettlement country and the UNHCR. It is 
not an attractive avenue for those wishing to gain easy access to a resettlement 
country. A 2015 report by the Cato Institute indicated that only three of the 
                                                 
64 ‘Resettlement Data Finder’, UNHCR (Web Page) <https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#C3ma>. Note that 
resettlement figures are based on departures, not numbers accepted for resettlement. Refugees 
accepted in one year are unlikely to depart in the same year, so the figures are indicative only. 
65 UNHCR, UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2018 (Report from 23th Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, 12–14 June 2017) 11 <https://www.unhcr.org/en-
au/protection/resettlement/593a88f27/unhcr-projected-global-resettlement-needs-2018.html>. 
66 In UNHCR resettlement reporting ‘Europe’ refers to the geographical region as opposed to the 
political region (ie the European Union). See UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 
2020 (n 3) 44–5. 
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68 82 Fed Reg 8977 (27 January 2017). 
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States 82 Fed Reg 8977, sec 5(a) (27 January 2017). 
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Resettlement in the Age of Trump’ (2017) 5(2) Journal on Migration and Human Security 263; 
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859,629 refugees who had been resettled in the United States since 2001 had 
been convicted of planning a terrorist attack, and none of these plans had been 
carried out.73 
The revised Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States,74 issued after several legal challenges to 
Executive Order 13769,75 removed the outright entry ban for foreign nationals 
granted admission to the United States as refugees. However, it retained the 
overall lower resettlement quota and the suspension of travel until 14 July 2017, 
after which resettlement would be conditionally resumed for individual 
countries after the additional checking of refugees.76 Recent media reports 
suggest that the 2020 resettlement quota may be reduced to between 3,000 and 
10,000 or even less.77 This is down from 30,000 in 2019,78 and almost 85,000 
in 2016.79 
The Executive Orders made by President Trump demonstrate clearly the 
vulnerability of resettlement to changes in international and domestic politics. 
Foreign policy goals, domestic politics, economic factors, the lobbying of 
private interest groups and the ‘mood’ of the domestic population drive 
resettlement decisions.80 Meanwhile, large numbers of refugees who cannot 
access effective protection in asylum countries and cannot return home are left 
to languish with no indication of when they will find a safe, permanent home, 
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76 Executive Order 13780 (n 74). 
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Politico (Article, 18 July 2019) <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/trump-officials-
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Sheet, 25 January 2019) <https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-refugee-
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80 Joanne van Selm, ‘Refugee Protection Policies and Security Issues’ in Edward Newman and 
Joanne van Selm (eds), Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human 
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because their resettlement is not in accordance with a resettlement country’s 
foreign or domestic policy goals.81 
3 Additional Criteria 
As outlined above, the UNHCR’s decision on whether to refer a refugee for 
resettlement is based on whether the refugee demonstrates a particular 
vulnerability or need for protection, making their continued stay in an asylum 
country untenable. Yet, the decision by a resettlement country on whether or 
not to accept an individual refugee is not purely needs-based. Resettlement 
countries apply their own additional resettlement criteria, unrelated to 
protection needs, to exclude some individuals from resettlement even though 
such individuals may need it most. 
One of the most commonly applied additional resettlement criteria is 
‘integration potential’.82 Yet, exactly what constitutes ‘integration potential’ 
and how it is measured are rarely articulated83 and this can have a 
discriminatory impact on refugees. In some cases, refugees are held to have low 
integration potential if they are illiterate, have no formal education, or are 
unemployed. It is assumed that they will find it more difficult to obtain 
employment and make connections in the resettlement country and therefore 
will have trouble integrating.84  
A lack of language skills and formal education may make resettlement more 
challenging initially, but such factors may be beyond the control of the 
refugee.85 Disruption to education and employment is almost inevitable when a 
refugee is forced to flee their home country, yet these circumstances may 
exclude them from resettlement.86 
The UNHCR has expressed serious concerns about applying this ‘ill-defined 
notion of integration potential’ to resettlement, believing that it will put at risk 
the very foundation upon which the UNHCR’s global resettlement activities are 
built.87 In the words of one of the UNHCR’s Senior Resettlement Officers, ‘the 
integration of refugees in a country of resettlement is a process not a criterion’88 
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84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.  
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2019 CONVENTION ON REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 189 
and the resettlement country plays a key role in ensuring integration is 
successful.Yet resettlement countries continue to use integration potential as a 
reason to reject refugees for resettlement. 
Other additional criteria imposed by resettlement countries are age, gender, 
family size and even nationality and ethnicity. Such criteria are usually not 
expressed in legislation or formal policies and are rarely announced publicly, 
but have a considerable impact on resettlement.89 The infiltration of 
discriminatory criteria into resettlement undermines the core humanitarian and 
non-discriminatory principles of refugee protection.90  
D The Value of Resettlement 
Given the vast discrepancy between resettlement need and resettlement places, 
the use of resettlement to justify restrictive asylum policies, the influence on 
resettlement of foreign and domestic policy concerns, and the discrimination in 
resettlement decision-making, it is natural to question the continued value and 
viability of resettlement in its current form.  
Yet, as stated in the closing comments of the NGO Annual Tripartite 
Consultations on Resettlement in 2009, ‘Resettlement Matters!’91 Firstly, 
resettlement matters to the refugees who need it, and there are increasing 
numbers of them as voluntary repatriation becomes untenable due to the 
protracted nature of some civil conflicts (for example, the war in Syria). It also 
matters to asylum countries which still see resettlement as a respite from the 
burden of refugee-hosting, and a means of preventing further internal and 
external refugee movements which are destabilising to the asylum countries and 
the refugees.  
In addition, resettlement matters to other refugees who may benefit from the 
additional ‘protection space’ that resettlement can open up.92 The use of 
resettlement to create this additional space is referred to as the ‘strategic use of 
resettlement’, and involves using resettlement in a manner that maximises the 
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direct or indirect benefits to populations other than the resettled refugees 
themselves, as well as the hosting state, other states or the international 
protection regime in general.93  
Finally, resettlement matters to communities in resettlement countries,94 who 
have generally welcomed refugees with open arms, notwithstanding the 
political climate in their countries. Resettlement countries affirmed the value of 
resettlement at a landmark conference in September 2016, stating that 
resettlement ‘has benefits for countries that host large refugee populations and 
for third countries that receive refugees’.95 While resettlement incurs costs for 
resettlement countries (explored further in the next section) refugees also bring 
skills and international connections, increase consumption and can stimulate 
trade and investment.96  
To realise the full potential of resettlement, however, the world needs a formal 
agreement that commits countries to the non-discriminatory resettlement of 
refugees who cannot return home and cannot remain in an asylum country. 
E Resettlement Numbers and Current Regulation 
There is currently no global agreement that imposes a legal obligation on parties 
to resettle refugees.97 As outlined above, resettlement is entirely a voluntary 
and discretionary activity by states.98 In 2018, only 27 countries accepted 
refugees for resettlement.99  
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In 2018 a total of 58 countries in the world were classified by the United 
Nations Development Program as having ‘very high human development’.100 I 
would argue that such countries are certainly capable of resettling refugees. 
Many of these countries already undertake resettlement but have been shown 
to have the economic capacity to increase their quotas.101  
Countries that offer resettlement usually have a domestic legislative regime in 
place to govern it. The scope of this article does not allow for a detailed analysis 
of each of these legislative regimes, although the UNHCR’s Resettlement 
Country Chapters contain a useful summary of the domestic laws on 
resettlement in 22 resettlement countries.102 By way of summary, domestic 
resettlement quotas are generally set out in policies, official statements, 
government decisions or disallowable legislative instruments.103 This means 
that they can be quickly and easily amended depending on the priorities of the 
government or legislature. Domestic resettlement criteria often include 
‘national interest’104 and foreign/regional policy criteria as well as integration 
or ‘establishment’ potential.105 
                                                 
100 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 
Statistical Update (Report, 2018) <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_ 
development_statistical_update.pdf>. The World Bank is no longer using the term ‘developing 
country’: Tim Fernholz, ‘The World Bank is Eliminating the Term “Developing Country” from 
its Data Vocabulary’, Quartz (16 May 2017) <https://qz.com/685626/the-world-bank-is-
eliminating-the-term-developing-country-from-its-data-vocabulary/>. However I have used it 
in this article because it is a commonly understood term and still used in UN discourse.  
101 Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, ‘Resettlement 
of Refugees, towards Greater Solidarity’ (Report Doc 13001, Ref 3894, Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, 1 October 2012) <http://website-pace.net/ 
documents/19863/168397/20140313-RefugeeResettlement-EN.pdf/feccb533-f15a-49fd-b6cd-
0aeba5e7dee2>. This report was published in 2012, and resettlement efforts have been 
increased since then, but still lag well behind Europe’s resettlement capacity. For the US 
resettlement capacity, see Katy Long, ‘Why America Could — and Should — Admit More 
Syrian Refugees’, Century Foundation (16 December 2015) 
<https://tcf.org/content/report/why-america-could-and-should-admit-more-syrian-refugees/>. 
102 ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook and Country Chapters’, UNHCR (Web Page, April 2018) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/protection/resettlement/4a2ccf4c6/unhcr-resettlement-
handbook-country-chapters.html>. There are also additional summaries compiled by the Rights 
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There are several multilateral agreements and non-binding declarations on 
resettlement.106 One of the newest is the Global Compact on Refugees which 
was adopted on 17 December 2018 by the United Nations General Assembly,107 
with 181 countries voting for its adoption, three abstaining (Eritrea, the 
Dominican Republic and Libya), and two voting against it (Hungary and the 
United States). 
The objectives of the Compact are to:  
1. ease pressures on host countries; 
2. enhance refugee self-reliance; 
3. expand access to third country solutions; and  
4. support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. 
The Compact contains a lot of practical guidance on how to achieve these aims, 
but it suffers from the same shortcomings as the other multilateral agreements 
and frameworks. It contains no firm, intergovernmentally-agreed outcome on 
the resettlement of refugees. It is intended to be operationalised through 
‘voluntary contributions to achieve collective outcomes and progress towards 
its objectives’.108 The Compact states that its success relies on ‘robust and well-
functioning arrangements for burden- and responsibility-sharing’, and a 
‘commitment on the part of the international community as a whole to 
providing concrete contributions’.109 Yet, as discussed earlier in this article, 
when states are left to determine their own resettlement contributions, the 
number of places falls well short of need.  
The Compact also does not stipulate that resettlement decisions should be made 
based on the needs of refugees, without reference to individual resettlement 
country criteria such as ‘integration potential’. In fact, it states that the 
contributions will be determined by the relevant state taking into account its 
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‘national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national 
policies and priorities’.110  
The lack of concrete resettlement quotas and the absence of a commitment to 
the use of non-discriminatory criteria in resettlement decision-making means 
that the Compact will unfortunately not address the main shortcomings of 
resettlement discussed above. This is unsurprising. A compact does not commit 
an agreeing party to specific remedial action. By contrast, conventions and 
treaties111 are legally binding on states under international law112 once they have 
been ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to by a state.113  
I therefore propose an International Convention on Refugee Resettlement, 
which will include mandatory resettlement quotas for countries with very high 
human development. It will also prescribe a non-discriminatory approach to 
resettlement decision-making, excluding the use of criteria such as ‘integration 
potential’. In so doing, it will help insulate resettlement from foreign and 
domestic political pressures. An International Convention on Refugee 
Resettlement will also: 1) elevate resettlement as a protection instrument by 
giving it the status afforded to asylum; 2) ensure that asylum responsibilities 
are separated from resettlement responsibilities; and 3) prevent the use of 
resettlement as a trade-off against the provision of asylum. 
Previous commentators have recognised the value of imposing quotas on states 
to commit them to providing protection, including resettlement. In 1997, Peter 
Schuck proposed the assigning of a refugee protection quota to each state, but 
also provided an ‘out’ clause whereby participating states could trade their 
quotas by paying other states to fulfil their obligations. This proposal has, 
however, been criticised by some who believe that it commodifies human 
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Carlo Carraro and Jaime de Melo (eds), Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime 
(VoxEU eBook, 2015) 155, 156; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 2(a). 
113 United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section, Treaty Handbook (Guidance 
document, 2012) (‘Treaty Handbook’) pt 3.3.33. The fourth way that a treaty or convention 
may become binding is through definitive signature but this is rarely used for multilateral 
treaties and is therefore outside the scope of this article. 
194 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
relationships and obligations.114 In addition, such an arrangement would not 
address the other problems with resettlement identified in this article: it would 
do nothing to prevent the influence of domestic politics on resettlement, or to 
prevent the application of discriminatory criteria to resettlement. Schuck’s 
proposal allows states to define the classes of refugees who could look to them 
for protection; they could, for example, limit protection to refugees from 
regions or from countries with historical ties to the state in question. 
F Justification for a Convention 
Treaties and conventions bind the actions of a state party not just because of 
formal ratification, acceptance or approval but also because: 
1. they give rise to an internal sense of legal obligation and, therefore, 
exert a greater ‘compliance pull’ than a mere domestic political 
commitment; 
2. they encourage states to judge non-compliance by other states harshly, 
and as a result states risk greater costs to their reputation and relations 
with other states if they violate the provisions; 
3. they have greater effects on domestic politics than political agreements, 
as they influence bureaucratic routines and assist in mobilising and 
empowering domestic advocates; and 
4. they create legal obligations that can be applied by courts, whether in 
an international tribunal or a state’s domestic courts.115 
States can, of course, limit their obligations under a convention by entering 
reservations.116 While reservations may weaken the legal effect of a convention, 
they are nevertheless useful because they broaden the pool of potential states 
parties.117 My draft convention, therefore, has provision for states to enter 
reservations, but not in relation to resettlement quotas or the non-discrimination 
requirements, as this would undermine the purpose of the convention and fail 
to address the current shortcomings of resettlement. 
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Conventions have several other advantages in addition to the legal obligations 
they impose. First, being global in nature they have a much longer reach than 
domestic or bilateral agreements.118 Second, they are more transparent because 
they can involve independent international organisations, particularly in 
compliance monitoring.119 For this reason, my draft Convention gives the 
UNHCR responsibility for overseeing its implementation and monitoring 
compliance, and obliges states parties to provide regular reports on their 
resettlement activities. Third, conventions serve a public awareness function by 
raising the profile of an issue of international importance.120 In this case, an 
International Convention on Refugee Resettlement would help communities in 
resettlement countries better understand resettlement and provide support to 
newly resettled refugees, thereby improving integration outcomes. 
G The Drawbacks of a Convention 
The main advantage of an International Convention on Refugee Resettlement 
— the fact that it can be binding under international law — is also a potential 
barrier to its success. A convention that forces states parties to commit to a 
resettlement quota and limits their ability to be selective about whom they 
resettle, is likely to be politically unattractive.121 The European Union’s failure 
to impose resettlement quotas on its Member States is telling in this respect,122 
as is the absence of firm resettlement commitments in the final draft of the 
Compact.123 After all, being able to pick and choose who becomes part of a 
nation and who enjoys the associated rights is an essential component of 
sovereign power.124 Some states may perceive mandatory resettlement quotas 
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and non-discriminatory selection criteria as an impermissible interference with 
this element of sovereignty.  
In addition, it could be argued that it is natural, perhaps even prudent, for 
political considerations to be factored into resettlement decisions and for a state 
to seek to assert its own interests in any arrangement with another state, even 
when the primary purpose is supposed to be the protection of vulnerable people. 
This has certainly been a feature of international aid funding over the years.125  
Yet, being party to a convention is in itself an exercise and an affirmation of a 
country’s sovereignty, a point that is often forgotten in discussions about the 
implications of convention ratification.126 The extensive ratification of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol127 show us, too, that states are willing to 
accept limitations to sovereignty in the interests of protecting the world’s most 
vulnerable. The non-refoulement principle is so widely understood and 
respected that it is now considered a principle of international customary law, 
applicable even to states which are not parties to the 1951 Convention.128 
The ongoing relevance and influence of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol were demonstrated recently in the New York Declaration, in which 
the 193 Member States reaffirmed their commitment to both documents and 
recognised ‘the importance of their full and effective application by states 
parties and the values they embody’.129 If states are willing to continue to accept 
limitations on their sovereignty in the form of non-refoulement of asylum 
seekers, it seems plausible that they might also accept a limitation that involves 
mandated, non-discriminatory refugee resettlement. In addition, the fact that 
they have agreed in the New York Declaration to at least consider committing 
to higher resettlement quotas and a non-discriminatory approach, provides 
some grounds for optimism. 
Another argument that could be raised against a convention with mandatory 
resettlement quotas is the cost. States are obliged to be cautious about how they 
spend taxpayer money and resettlement does not come cheap. The cost of 
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resettling a refugee in the United States in 2016 was reported to be 
approximately AUD 25,000, while the cost in the United Kingdom was as high 
as AUD 152,000.130  
Yet research shows that the resettlement of refugees is not simply a drain on 
financial resources; rather, it is an investment.131 Australian studies have 
demonstrated that the net economic impact of refugee resettlement is positive, 
although admittedly it may take some years for this to eventuate as refugees 
settle in, learn the national language, upgrade their skills and make the 
connections needed to find employment.132 No studies have demonstrated that 
resettled refugees impose an economic burden over the long term.133  
The advantages of an International Convention on Refugee Resettlement 
outweigh the disadvantages.  
III CONCLUSION  
The momentum is building for a global agreement on refugee resettlement. It 
is desperately needed, primarily to bring resettlement places into line with 
resettlement needs, but also to remove discriminatory criteria such as 
‘integration potential’ from resettlement decision-making and to return 
resettlement to a needs-based protection solution uncorrupted by foreign policy 
or domestic influences and working in tandem with asylum protections.  
An International Convention on Refugee Resettlement provides an ideal 
solution. It imposes legal obligations on states with regard to resettlement, but 
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also offers increased transparency about resettlement. Larger resettlement 
programs would ease the burden on asylum countries, and potentially create 
conditions for the safe integration of remaining refugee populations. A 
convention is also more likely to bring the number of resettlement places into 
line with global resettlement needs than the non-binding Compact. 
This article and the accompanying draft convention offer suggested wording 
that might be useful in building on the Compact to create a binding agreement 
on resettlement. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE CONVENTION 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
PREAMBLE 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,  
 
CONSIDERING that the United Nations and the international community have 
manifested profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees 
the widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms as 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
CONSIDERING that states have indicated their willingness to work cooperatively 
at an international level to assist refugees, including through adoption of the 
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact on 
Refugees, 
CONSIDERING that it is desirable to extend the scope of protection afforded 
refugees by means of new international agreements, 
CONSIDERING that it is necessary to find durable solutions to address refugee 
movements, and resettlement presents the most desirable solution for some 
refugees, 
CONSIDERING that refugee movements create challenges for countries of first 
asylum, and international cooperation is required to assist them to respond, 
EXPRESSING the wish that all states, recognising the social and humanitarian 
nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to: 
protect refugees,  
offer resettlement to refugees for whom there is no other durable 
solution, 
assist each other to establish and implement resettlement in their 
respective states and, 
prevent resettlement from becoming a cause of tension between states, 
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NOTING that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for 
the protection of refugees, and recognising that the effective coordination of 
measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the cooperation of 
states with the High Commissioner, 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 — Definitions  
1. Definition of the term ‘resettlement’ 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘resettlement’ shall refer 
to the process by which a refugee is: 
assessed by the UNHCR as being a refugee in need of resettlement; 
referred by the UNHCR for resettlement consideration; and 
selected and transferred from a state in which the refugee has sought 
protection to a third state that has agreed to admit the refugee as a 
permanent resident.  
2. Definition of ‘family member’ of a refugee 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘family member’ shall 
refer to all those who consider themselves and are considered by each other, to 
be part of a family, and who wish to live together. 
3. Definition of the UNHCR 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the acronym ‘UNHCR’ shall refer 
to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or any 
other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it. 
Article 2 — Entry into Force 
This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day 
of deposit of the third instrument of ratification or accession. 
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For each state ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the 
third instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into 
force one year following the date of deposit by such state of its instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
Article 3 — Non-Discrimination 
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees 
without discrimination based on race, age, religion, ethnicity, nationality, 
political opinion, gender, sexual preference, disability or integration prospects. 
They shall apply these provisions when making any decision on whether or not 
to resettle a refugee. 
Article 4 — Rights Granted apart from This Convention 
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits 
granted by a Contracting State to refugees under any instrument or law. 
Article 5 — Refugee Involvement in Resettlement 
Contracting States shall, to the greatest extent possible, incorporate the views 
of refugees in the design and implementation of resettlement processes and 
services. 
Contracting States shall, to the greatest extent possible, ensure that resettlement 
is implemented in a manner that does not reinforce the oppression of women, 
children and minority groups. 
Article 6 — Resettlement Quotas 
Each Contracting State’s resettlement quota shall be determined by the 
UNHCR annually, based on the country’s resettlement capacity. The 
resettlement quota may be modified in the event of a natural disaster, civil 
conflict or other extreme event. 
Contracting States which have met their annual resettlement quota shall not be 
compelled to accept further refugees for resettlement in the same year, but may 
do so if they choose. 
Contracting States may, in cooperation with the UNHCR, substitute 
multiannual resettlement quotas for annual resettlement quotas. 
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Article 7 — Bilateral, Multilateral and Regional Resettlement Coordination 
Nothing in this Convention should be taken as limiting the entitlement of 
Contracting States to coordinate resettlement with each other, including by 
reallocating resettlement places among each other, on a bilateral, multilateral 
or regional basis, in coordination with the UNHCR. 
Article 8 — Resettlement Transfers 
Refugees requiring resettlement who are within the territory of a Contracting 
State that has met its annual resettlement quota may be transferred by the 
Contracting State (the ‘transferring state’) to an alternative state (the ‘receiving 
state’), provided that the receiving state is a party to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. 
The UNHCR is the agency responsible for identifying the receiving state, and 
negotiating and coordinating the resettlement transfer in cooperation with the 
transferring and receiving states. 
The transferred refugees, once resettled, shall constitute part of the receiving 
state’s existing annual resettlement quota (if it has one).  
The resettlement transfer process shall be conducted as expediently as possible 
and with every effort to minimise negative impacts for the refugee and the 
refugee’s family members. 
A resettlement transfer shall not be undertaken without the consent of the 
refugee. 
 
CHAPTER 2: RIGHTS AND WELFARE 
Article 9 — Privacy 
Contracting States shall ensure that in all actions concerning the resettlement 
of a refugee, the privacy and personal information of the refugee are protected. 
 
 
2019 CONVENTION ON REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 203 
Article 10 — No Compulsion or Cost for Resettlement 
Contracting States shall not compel a refugee to resettle against his or her will, 
nor penalise the refugee for a decision not to resettle. 
Contracting States shall not impose a monetary fee on a refugee in relation to 
the resettlement process. 
Article 11 — No Right to Resettlement 
A refugee does not have a right to resettlement. 
Article 12 — Determination of Resettlement Need 
The UNHCR shall be responsible for determining the total number and 
geographic distribution of refugees in need of resettlement and shall provide 
this information to Contracting States at least annually. 
The UNHCR shall be responsible for determining whether an individual 
refugee is in need of resettlement and, if so, for referring the refugee to a state 
for resettlement consideration. 
The decision regarding resettlement need shall be based entirely on an 
assessment of the protection needs of the individual and, where relevant, the 
individual’s family members. 
A decision by the UNHCR on resettlement need is not appealable. 
Article 13 — Resettlement Decision 
Contracting States shall decide whether or not a refugee referred for 
resettlement shall be resettled within their territory.  
All resettlement decisions shall be non-discriminatory and a decision to deny 
resettlement to a refugee should be made only when compelling reasons of 
national security require it. 
Article 14 — Special Resettlement Cases 
Contracting States shall allocate at least 10% of their resettlement quota to 
emergency cases (or less if the emergency case pipeline has been exhausted) in 
cooperation with the UNHCR. 
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Article 15 — Integration 
Contracting States shall facilitate the efficient integration of resettled refugees, 
including by establishing legislative and policy instruments ensuring resettled 
refugees have status and rights and providing access to essential services. 
 
CHAPTER 3: EXECUTORY AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 
Article 16 — Cooperation of the National Authorities with the United Nations 
Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of 
its functions, including the supervision of the application of this Convention. 
In order to enable the UNHCR to make reports to the competent organs of the 
United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide to the UNHCR, in 
the appropriate form, information and statistical data requested by it 
concerning: 
the number of resettlement places offered to refugees and the number 
of refugees successfully resettled by the Contracting State; 
the reasons for the rejection of resettlement referrals; 
the integration program/s available to resettled refugees in the 
Contracting State’s territory; 
the implementation of other articles of this Convention; and 
laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be in force 
in the Contracting State relating to refugee resettlement. 
 
CHAPTER 4: FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 17 — Settlement of Disputes 
Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application which cannot be settled by other means shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the 
dispute. 
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A state party may refer a concern regarding the application of the Convention 
by another state party, to the International Court of Justice or the UN Security 
Council to impose sanctions on a breaching state or to persuade a breaching 
state to amend its resettlement program. 
Article 18 — Signature, Ratification and Accession 
This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 1 January 2020 
and shall thereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. It shall remain open for signature until 31 December 2020.  
This Convention shall be open for signature by any Member State of the United 
Nations, and also by any other state invited to participate by the General 
Assembly. 
Accession or ratification shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of 
accession or ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 19 — Territorial Application Clause 
Any state may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that 
this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international 
relations of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when 
the Convention enters into force for the state concerned. 
At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect 
as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of 
the Convention for the state concerned, whichever is the later. 
With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the 
time of signature, ratification or accession, each state concerned shall extend 
the application of this Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary 
for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the governments of such territories. 
Article 20 — Reservations 
At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any Contracting State may 
make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 – 5 and 
8 – 12 inclusive. 
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Any Contracting State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
this article may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to 
that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 21 — Denunciation 
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year 
from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
Any Contracting State which has made a declaration or notification of 
extension under article 18 may at any time thereafter, by a notification to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, declare that the Convention shall 
cease to extend to such territory one year after the date of receipt of the 
notification by the Secretary-General. 
Article 22 — Revision 
Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by 
a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, 
to be taken in respect of such request. 
Article 23 — Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the 
United Nations and Non-Member States of declarations, notifications, 
signatures, ratifications, accessions, reservations, withdrawals and requests for 
revision made in accordance with the articles of this Convention, as well as the 
date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance with article 
20. 
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APPENDIX 2: EXPLANATORY NOTES 




This replicates some of the language used in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (‘1951 Convention’), and makes specific reference to the 
1951 Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1967 
Protocol’), in an attempt to draw the three documents together as a ‘package’. 
This is with the intention that the influence and wide acceptance of the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol will be brought to bear on this Convention. 
The reference to the role of the UNHCR lays the groundwork for the later 
provisions which grant that organisation the power to set the resettlement 
quotas and monitor the implementation of the Convention. 
Article 1: Definitions 
This article sets out the bodies to which this Convention applies and the 
meaning of ‘resettlement’. The definition of ‘family member’ is wider than that 
provided in the domestic legislation of some resettlement countries. This is 
because refugee families are not always nuclear and may include members of 
the extended family. This definition is taken from the Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,134 and thus has solid 
support in international law. 
Article 2: Non-discrimination 
This is one of the core articles of the Convention, as it addresses one of the 
major problems with resettlement — the use of discriminatory criteria to pick 
and choose refugees for resettlement. Support for the principle of non-
discrimination can be found in the many international conventions and 
agreements on the topic, such as the International Convention on the 
                                                 
134 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(International Committee of the Red Cross,1 January 1986).  
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,135 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women136 and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.137 
Article 3: Rights granted apart from this Convention 
This article prevents the Convention from overriding protections set out in the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, as well as those in other international 
human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child.138 
This includes the guarantee that resettled refugees will acquire the citizenship 
of the resettlement country, which is prescribed in article 34 of the 1951 
Convention. 
Article 4: Refugee involvement in resettlement 
The involvement of refugees in the resettlement process and decision is 
currently extremely limited. They have no right to resettlement, nor any right 
to determine in which country they will be resettled.139 The UNHCR and major 
resettlement countries have often highlighted the importance of involving 
refugees in resettlement decision-making and integration activities.140 
Article 5: Resettlement quotas 
This is one of the core articles of the Convention. It commits signatories to 
resettling a portion of the total number of refugees assessed by the UNHCR as 
being in need of resettlement. The precise method used to calculate the portion 
is not prescribed so as to allow for this to be negotiated by states and modified 
over time, depending on the most reliable assessment of resettlement capacity. 
                                                 
135 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).  
136 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for 
signature 1 March 1980, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981).  
137 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007) 
2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).  
138 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).  
139 UNHCR Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement (n 4). 
140 UNHCR, The Integration of Resettled Refugees (Guidance Booklet, 2013) <https://www. 
unhcr.org/52a6d85b6.pdf>. 
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One potential method could be to balance the following for each of the 51 
countries rated as having ‘very high human development’ by the United 
Nations Development Program: 
Human Development Index; 
Population; 
Land mass; and 
Number of persons of concern to the UNHCR currently being hosted. 
‘Persons of concern’ to the UNHCR include refugees, asylum seekers, 
internally displaced persons, returnees (refugees and IDPs) and stateless 
persons.141 It is recognised that a country hosting a large number of persons of 
concern has less capacity to provide resettlement to refugees; therefore its quota 
could be reduced accordingly. 
The method used to calculate the portions would need to be agreed upon by 
states (as would the rest of the declaration text) and this is likely to be the 
subject of considerable debate. The method I have proposed has the advantage 
of being less vulnerable to manipulation because it would not be in a country’s 
interest to underestimate its HDI in an attempt to reduce its resettlement 
quota.142 
Article 6: Bilateral, multilateral and regional resettlement coordination 
This article provides authority for states parties to pool and redistribute their 
resettlement quotas in cooperation with each other, and to continue cooperating 
on a regional basis to strengthen and expand resettlement. Several such 
agreements already exist or are in development, such as the proposed European 
Union Resettlement Framework.143  
The article stipulates that such reallocation should be done in coordination with 
the UNHCR, both to keep the agency aware of where refugees are being 
resettled (for example for the purposes of family reunification) and to ensure 
that refugees are not resettled in a country that does not have the capacity to 
host them.  
                                                 
141 Population Statistics (n 32). 
142 Schuck (n 1). 
143 Radjenovic (n 106). 
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Article 7: Resettlement transfers 
Article 7 is designed to ensure that no state party is overburdened by having to 
resettle more refugees than it can accommodate. It is therefore likely to 
encourage more states to sign the Convention. Where a country has exhausted 
its resettlement allocation, a refugee in need of resettlement may be transferred 
(with that refugee’s consent) to another resettlement country. If the refugee 
does not consent they cannot be forcibly transferred. The resettlement country 
may be able to reduce its resettlement quota for the following year, in 
negotiation with the UNHCR. This helps prevent the ‘pull’ factor — the 
attraction of asylum seekers to particular resettlement countries. 
Article 8: Privacy 
Specific protection for the privacy of refugees is not set out in the 1951 
Convention or the 1967 Protocol; therefore it has been included here. 
Article 9: No compulsion or cost for resettlement and Article 10: No right to 
resettlement 
These articles set out some of the core requirements of resettlement: that it be 
voluntary on the part of the refugee and not a mandatory imposition on the 
resettlement country. 
Article 11: Determination of resettlement need and Article 12: Resettlement 
decision 
These articles provide a division of responsibilities. The UNHCR is responsible 
for determining which refugees require resettlement, but the ultimate decision 
to offer resettlement remains with the resettlement country. 
The articles also ensure a mostly non-discriminatory approach to resettlement. 
The exception to this is the security criterion: the 1951 Convention already 
allows for the exclusion of a refugee based on security concerns, and this is also 
permitted under the current Convention. 
Article 13: Special Resettlement Cases 
The UNHCR has frequently emphasised the need to expand the number of 
resettlement places offered for emergency situations.144 Resettlement on an 
emergency basis can be life saving. Settling aside at least 10% of the 
                                                 
144 UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2020 (n 3). 
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resettlement quota for emergency cases will ensure this highly vulnerable group 
is resettled. 
Article 14: Integration 
Integration has moved from being a post-arrival process undertaken by the 
resettlement country in cooperation with the resettled refugee to function as a 
discriminatory criterion for resettlement. This article helps return it to the 
former position. 
Article 15: Cooperation of the National Authorities with the United Nations 
Resettlement reporting already occurs but is sometimes inaccurate or 
incomplete.145 This article formalises the reporting requirements and makes the 
resettlement process more transparent. 
Final Clauses: Articles 16 – 23 
These articles outline the methods by which a state can become a party to the 
Convention, make reservations or denounce the Convention. The language of 
these articles is based on that used in other conventions, such as the 1951 
Convention. 
Article 17 includes wording that will enable non-state agents to ratify the 
Convention where they are invited to do so by the General Assembly. One 
example is Palestine, which is currently afforded non-member observer status 
by the General Assembly but has been given the right to become a party to 
treaties and conventions for which the UN Secretary-General is the 
depository.146 
Article 20 sets out that the Convention will come into force only once it has 
been ratified or acceded to by three states. Ideally, the three states would be 
those with the longest running, and largest resettlement programs — that is, the 
United States, Canada and Australia. Without the support of these three states 
it would be difficult, although not impossible, to implement the Convention.   
In recognition of the fact that countries without an existing resettlement 
program may take some time to establish the necessary processes, article 20 
                                                 
145 For example, many resettlement countries do not provide reasons for rejecting cases for 
resettlement. 
146 Status of Palestine in the United Nations, UN GAOR, 67th sess, Agenda Item 37, UN Doc 
A/RES/67/19 (4 December 2012). 
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allows for progressive realisation of the Convention’s targets by providing one 
year between the date of ratification or accession and the date that the 
Convention will enter into force for that country.  
Appeal mechanisms 
Like the 1951 Convention, this Convention does not provide a mechanism by 
which an individual can appeal against a breach of its provisions, nor does it 
establish a committee to hear such appeals. Such a mechanism was deliberately 
omitted as it could open the door to potentially millions of appeals by refugees 
found not to be eligible for resettlement. Under article 17 one state party can 
refer a dispute with another state party concerning its application of the 
Convention to the International Court of Justice or for the UN Security Council. 
